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Summary
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been
raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States
with temporary visas despite provisions in immigration laws that bar the admission
of terrorists. Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who
wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted, with
certain exceptions noted in law.  The report of the 9/11 Commission maintained that
border security was not considered a national security matter prior to September 11,
and as a result the State Department’s consular officers were not treated as full
partners in counterterrorism efforts.  The 9/11 Commission has made several
recommendations that underscore the urgency of implementing legislative provisions
on visa policy and immigration control that Congress enacted several years ago.
The 107th Congress expanded the definition of terrorism and the designation of
terrorist organizations used to determine the inadmissibility and removal of aliens in
the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56).  Another law, the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act (P.L. 107-173), sought to improve the visa issuance process
by mandating data sharing so that consular officers have access to relevant electronic
information.  This law also required the development of an interoperable electronic
data system to be used to share information relevant to alien admissibility and
removability and required that all visas issued by October 2004 have biometric
identifiers.  The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) transferred to the Directorate
of Border and Transportation Security in the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) the authority to issue regulations regarding visa issuances and assigns staff to
consular posts abroad.  Although the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Consular
Affairs remains the agency responsible for issuing visas, DHS’s Citizenship and
Immigrant Services approves immigrant petitions, and DHS’s Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection inspects all people who enter the United States.
The House and Senate recently passed H.R. 4417, which would extend the
deadline for installing the scanners/readers of biometric visas to October 26, 2005.
The Senate Judiciary Committee has reported S. 710, which would further broaden
the security and terrorism grounds of inadmissibility to exclude aliens who have
participated in the commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings abroad.  The
Senate Judiciary Committee has also reported S. 1609, which would amend the INA
to make an alien excludable from United States for nonpayment of child support. A
bill (S. 2661) to make visa revocation a ground for removal has been introduced.
Meanwhile, nonimmigrant (i.e., temporary) visas issued abroad dipped to 4.9
million in FY2003 after peaking at 7.6 million in FY2001.  Thus far, visas for legal
permanent residents (LPRs) have stayed at around one million annually, but the
number of LPR visas issued abroad has dipped while those aliens who adjust to LPR
status within the United States has grown.  This slowdown in visa issuances has
sparked concern among the business community, some of whom argue they are
adversely affected by the new visa policies.  Others are expressing scepticism about
the cost, time, and complexity of developing interoperable databases, a feature many
others see as essential to enhanced border security.
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1 Authorities to except or to waive visa requirements are specified in law, such as the broad
parole authority of the Attorney General under §212(d)(5) of INA and the specific authority
of the Visa Waiver Program in §217 of INA.
2 Other departments, notably the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), play roles in the approval process depending on the category or type
of visa sought, and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sets policy on
the health-related grounds for inadmissibility discussed below.
Visa Issuances:
Policy, Issues, and Legislation
Introduction
In the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable
concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens (i.e., noncitizens or
foreign nationals) who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas.  The
report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also
known as the 9/11 Commission) maintained that border security was not considered
a national security matter prior to September 11, and as a result the State
Department’s consular officers were not treated as full partners in counterterrorism
efforts.  The 9/11 Commission has made several recommendations that underscore
the urgency of implementing legislative provisions on visa policy and immigration
control that Congress enacted several years ago.  Fears that lax enforcement of
immigration laws regulating the admission of foreign nationals into the United States
may continue to make the United States vulnerable to further terrorist attacks led
many to call for revisions in the visa policy and changes in who administers
immigration law.
Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to
come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted.1  Under current
law, three departments — the Department of State (DOS), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) — each play key
roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens.2  DOS’s
Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is the agency responsible for issuing
visas, DHS’s Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is charged with
approving immigrant petitions, and DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) is tasked with inspecting all people who enter the United States.  DOJ’s
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has a significant policy role
through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases.
This report opens with an overview of visa issuances, with sections on
procedures for aliens coming to live in the United States permanently and on
CRS-2
3 For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RS20916, Immigration and Naturalization
Fundamentals, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
4 For background and analysis of visa issuance policy and activities, see CRS Report
RL31512, Visa Issuances:  Policy, Issues, and Legislation, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
5 For background and further discussion of humanitarian cases, see CRS Report RL31269,
Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno; and CRS Report RS20844,
Temporary Protected Status:  Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem
and Karma Ester.
6 USCIS forms are available at [http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfee/index.htm].
procedures for aliens admitted for temporary stays.3  It includes a discussion of  visa
screening policies, including inadmissibility, databases, an analysis of visa refusals,
biometric visas and other major visa policy procedures.  Summaries of key laws
revising visa policy enacted in the 107th Congress follows.  The final section analyzes
selected issues in the 108th Congress, notably the 9/11 Commission
recommendations, visa revocation and removal, new technologies, potential impact
on business, and other security concerns.
Overview on Visa Issuances
There are two broad classes of aliens that are issued visas:  immigrants and
nonimmigrants.4  Those for whom visas are not required, including humanitarian
admissions, such as asylees, refugees, parolees and other aliens granted relief from
deportation, are handled separately under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Those aliens granted asylum or refugee status ultimately are eligible to become legal
permanent residents (LPRs).5  Illegal aliens or unauthorized aliens include those
noncitizens who either entered the United States surreptitiously, i.e., entered without
inspection, or who violated the terms of their visas.
The documentary requirements for visas are stated in §222 of the INA, with
some discretion for further specifications or exceptions by regulation as discussed
below.  Generally, the application requirements are more extensive for aliens who
wish to permanently live in the United States than those coming for visits.  The
amount of paperwork required and the length of adjudication process to obtain a visa
to come to the United States is analogous to that of the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) tax forms and review procedures.  Just as persons with uncomplicated earnings
and expenses may file an IRS “short form” while those whose financial
circumstances are more complex may file a series of IRS forms, so too an alien
whose situation is straightforward and whose reason for seeking a visa is easily
documented generally has fewer forms and procedural hurdles than an alien whose
circumstances are more complex.  There are over 70 U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) forms as well as DOS forms that pertain to the visa
issuance process.6
Permanent Admissions
Aliens who wish to come to live permanently in the United States must meet a
set of criteria specified in the INA.  They must qualify as:
CRS-3
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Visas Issued Abroad LPR Status Granted 
Source: CRS presentation of published USCIS  and Consular Affairs data.
Figure 1.  Immigrant Visas Issued and LPR Status Granted,
 FY1998-FY2002
! a spouse or minor child of a U.S. citizen;
! a parent, adult child or sibling of an adult U.S. citizen;
! a spouse or minor child of a legal permanent resident;
! an employee that a U.S. employer has gotten approval from the
Department of Labor to hire;
! a person of extraordinary or exceptional ability in specified areas;
! a refugee or asylee determined to be fleeing persecution;
! a winner of a visa in the diversity lottery; or
! a person eligible under other specialized provisions of law.
Petitions for immigrant, i.e., LPR, status, are first filed with USCIS by the
sponsoring relative or employer in the United States.  If the prospective immigrant
is already residing in the United States, the USCIS handles the entire process, which
is called “adjustment of status.”  If the prospective LPR does not have legal residence
in the United States, the petition is forwarded to Consular Affairs in their home
country after USCIS has reviewed it.  The Consular Affairs officer (when the alien
is coming from abroad) and USCIS adjudicator (when the alien is adjusting status in
the United States) must be satisfied that the alien is entitled to the immigrant status.
Many LPRs are adjusting status from within the United States rather than receiving
visas issued abroad by Consular Affairs.  For example, over 1 million aliens became
LPRs in both FY2001 and FY2002, while only 406,000 and 389,00 immigrant visas
were issued abroad in those respective years, as Figure 1 indicates.
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7 22 CFR §42.62.
8 For a recent review of Consular Affair’s role in visa processing, see U.S. General
Accounting Office, Border Security:  Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI, Oct. 21, 2002.
9 For a full discussion and analysis of nonimmigrant visas, see CRS Report RL31381, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.  (Hereafter cited as
CRS Report RL31381, Temporary Admissions.)
10 22 CFR §41.11(a).
11 §214(b) of INA; 8U.S.C. 1184(b).
A personal interview is required for all prospective LPRs.7  The burden of proof
is on the applicant to establish eligibility for the type of visa for which the application
is made.  Consular Affairs officers (when the alien is coming from abroad) and
USCIS adjudicators (when the alien is adjusting status in the United States) must
confirm that the alien is not ineligible for a visa under the so-called “grounds for
inadmissibility” of the INA, which include criminal, terrorist, and public health
grounds for exclusion discussed below.8
Temporary Admissions
Aliens seeking to come to the United States temporarily rather than to live
permanently are known as nonimmigrants.9  These aliens are admitted to the United
States for a temporary period of time and an expressed reason.  There are 24 major
nonimmigrant visa categories, and 70 specific types of nonimmigrant visas are issued
currently.  Most of these nonimmigrant visa categories are defined in §101(a)(15) of
the INA.  These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral
that denotes their subsection in §101(a)(15), e.g., B-2 tourists, E-2 treaty investors,
F-1 foreign students, H-1B temporary professional workers, J-1 cultural exchange
participants, or S-4 terrorist informants.
As with immigrant visas, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish
eligibility for nonimmigrant status and the type of nonimmigrant visa for which the
application is made. Nonimmigrants must demonstrate that they are coming for a
limited period and for a specific purpose.  The Consular Affairs officer, at the time
of application for a visa, as well as the Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP)
inspectors, at the time of application for admission, must be satisfied that the alien
is entitled to a nonimmigrant status.10  The law exempts only the H-1 workers, L
intracompany transfers, and V family members from the requirement that they prove
that they are not coming to live permanently.11  USCIS and CBP play a role
determining eligibility for certain nonimmigrant visas, notably H workers and L
intracompany transfers.  Also, if a nonimmigrant in the United States wishes to
change from one nonimmigrant category to another, such as from a tourist visa to a
student visa, the alien files a change of status application with the USCIS.  If the
alien leaves the United States while the change of status is pending, the alien is
presumed to have relinquished the application.
CRS-5
12 22 CFR §41.102.
13 U.S. Department of State,  Myths and Facts about U.S. Immigration Standards for Saudi
Arabian Immigrants, Fact Sheet issued July 8, 2002.
14 Federal Register, vol. 68, no. 129, July 7, 2003, pp. 40127-40129.
Source: CRS presentation of DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs data.







Figure 2.  All Nonimmigrant Visas Issued, 
FY1990-FY2003
Personal interviews are generally required for foreign nationals seeking
nonimmigrant visas.  Interviews, however, may be waived in certain cases; prior to
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, personal interviews for applicants for B
visitor visas reportedly were often waived.12  This waiver formed the basis for the
controversial and allegedly fraud-prone “Visa Express” in Saudi Arabia (now
suspended) where travel agents pre-screened visa applicants and submitted petitions
on behalf of the aliens.13  After September 11, 2001, the number of personal
interviews rose significantly as part of broader efforts to meet national security goals.
DOS issued interim regulations on July 7, 2003, that officially tightened up the
requirements for personal interviews and substantially narrowed the class of
nonimmigrants eligible for the waiver of a personal interview. Now personal
interview waivers may be granted only to children under age 16, persons 60 years or
older, diplomats and representatives of international organizations, aliens who are
renewing a visa they obtained within the prior 12 months, and individual cases for
whom a waiver is warranted for national security or unusual circumstances.14
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15 For additional analysis, see CRS Report RL31381, Temporary Admissions.
16 In FY2002, nonimmigrants from VWP countries account for 47% of all nonimmigrants
admitted to the United States and 54% of nonimmigrants admitted for business or pleasure
(i.e., on B-visas).  Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2002
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Oct. 2003.  Available at [http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/
shared/aboutus/statistics/index.htm].
17 See CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.
18 See CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Waiving the Documentary
Requirements for Visas and Passports to Enter the United States, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and
Andorra Bruno, Oct. 27, 2003.
19 INA §212(d)(4)(A).  The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) transferred most
immigration-related functions from DOJ to DHS.  It is uncertain as of this writing whether
this waiver authority remains, in whole or in part, with DOJ and the Attorney General or
(continued...)
Nonimmigrant visas issued abroad dipped to 5.8 million in FY2002 after
peaking at 7.6 million in FY2001.  Preliminary FY2003 data indicate a further drop
to 4.9 million nonimmigrant visas issued.  Over the past dozen years, as Figure 2
illustrates, DOS has typically issued about 6 million nonimmigrant visas annually.
The growth in the late 1990s has been largely attributable to the issuances of
border crossing cards to residents of Canada and Mexico and the issuances of
temporary worker visas.  Combined, visitors for tourism and business comprised the
largest group of nonimmigrants in FY2002, about 4.3 million, down from 5.7 million
in FY2000.  Other notable categories were students (4.5%), exchange visitors (5.0%)
and temporary workers (5.1%).  Depending on the visa category and the country the
alien is coming from, the nonimmigrant visa may be valid for several years and may
permit multiple entries.  USCIS reported 33.7 million nonimmigrant entries in
FY2000 and 27.9 million in FY2002.15
Visa Waiver Program.  Not all aliens are required to have a visa to visit the
United States.  Indeed, most visitors enter the United States without nonimmigrant
visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).  This provision of INA allows the
visa documentary requirements to be waived for aliens coming as visitors from 27
countries, e.g., Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and
Switzerland.  Thus, visitors from these countries are not required to obtain a visa
from a U.S. consulate abroad.  The DHS reports that 13.2 million nonimmigrants
entered the United States through VWP in FY2002, down from 17 million in
FY2001.16  Since aliens entering through VWP do not have visas, CBP inspectors at
the port of entry are responsible for performing the background checks and making
the determination of whether the alien is admissible.17
Waiving the Documentary Requirements.  In addition to the Visa Waiver
Program, there are a number of exceptions to documentary requirements for a visa
that have been established by law, treaty, or regulation.18  The INA also authorizes
the Attorney General and the Secretary of State acting jointly to waive the
documentary requirements of INA §212(a)(7)(B)(i), including the passport
requirement, on the basis of unforeseen emergency in individual cases.19  In 2003, the
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19 (...continued)
with the Secretary of DHS.
20 For additional information about these exceptions, see 8 CFR §212.1; 22 CFR §41.1; and
22 CFR §41.2.
21 §212(a) of INA.
22 On Sept. 16, 2003, the Administration announced the establishment of the interagency
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate terrorist watch lists.  The FBI temporarily
will administer TSC and assume responsibility for the State Department’s TIPOFF database.
Representatives from the intelligence community, law enforcement, DHS and DOS will be
(continued...)
Administration scaled back the circumstances in which the visa and passport
requirements are waived.20
Grounds for Exclusion
All aliens must undergo reviews performed by DOS consular officers abroad
and BCBP inspectors upon entry to the U.S.  These reviews are intended to ensure
that they are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for
inadmissibility spelled out in INA.21  These criteria are
! health-related grounds;
! criminal history;
! security and terrorist concerns;
! public charge (e.g., indigence);
! seeking to work without proper labor certification;
! illegal entrants and immigration law violations;
! ineligible for citizenship; and,
! aliens previously removed.
Some provisions may be waived or are not applicable in the case of nonimmigrants,
refugees (e.g., public charge), and other aliens.  All family-based immigrants and
employment-based immigrants who are sponsored by a relative must have binding
affidavits of support signed by U.S. sponsors in order to show that they will not
become public charges.
Databases.  Consular officers use the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)
to screen visa applicants.  Over 75 million records of visa applications are now
automated in the CCD, with some records dating back to the mid-1990s.  Since
February 2001, the CCD stores photographs of all visa applicants in electronic form,
and more recently the CCD has begun storing finger prints of the right and left index
fingers.  In addition to indicating the outcome of any prior visa application of the
alien in the CCD, the system links with other databases to flag problems that may
impact on the issuance of the visa.
For some years, consular officers have been required to check the background
of all aliens in the “lookout” databases, specifically the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS) and TIPOFF databases.22 CLASS now contains 15.4
CRS-8
22 (...continued)
involved. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration
and Border Security, Information Sharing and Coordination for Visa Issuance: Our First
Line of Defense for Homeland Security, hearing, Sept. 23, 2003.
23 The State Department’s CLASS and TIPOFF terrorist databases interface with the
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) used by the DHS immigration inspectors.  IBIS
also interfaces with the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Treasury
Enforcement and Communications System (TECS II), National Automated Immigration
Lookout System (NAILS), and the Non-immigrant Information System (NIIS).
24 For background and analysis, see CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress:
Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin.
25 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International
Operations and Terrorism, The Post 9/11 Visa Reforms and New Technology:  Achieving the
Necessary Security Improvements in a Global Environment, hearing, Oct. 23, 2003.
(Hereafter cited as Senate Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, The
Post 9/11 Visa Reforms.)
26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls
Over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Needs Improvement, GAO-02-972, Sept.
2002.
million  records on people ineligible to receive visas, including reportedly 90,000
people who are suspected or known terrorists and their associates or associated with
suspected or known terrorist organizations.23  There is also the “Terrorist Exclusion
List” (TEL) which lists organizations designated as terrorist-supporting and includes
the names of individuals associated with these organizations.24
Consular officers also send suspect names to the FBI for a name check program
called Visa Condor.  Visa Condor is part of the broader Security Advisory Opinion
(SAO) system that requires a consular officer abroad to refer selected visa cases,
identified by law enforcement and intelligence information, for greater review by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.25
With procedures distinct from the terrorist watch lists, consular officers screen
visa applicants for employment or study that would give the foreign national access
to controlled technologies, i.e., those that could be used to upgrade military
capabilities, and refers foreign nationals from countries of concern (e.g., China, India,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria) to the Department of
Commerce.26  This screening is part of a name-check procedure known as Visa
Mantis, which has the following stated objectives: stem the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and missile delivery systems; restrain the development of
destabilizing conventional military capabilities in certain regions of the world;
prevent the transfer of arms and sensitive dual-use items to terrorist states; and
maintain U.S. advantages in certain militarily critical technologies.
Janice Jacobs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, reported
during a congressional hearing in October 2003, that the once paper-based process
of checking suspect names with other federal agencies and departments is moving
toward the interoperable system mandated by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Reform Act.
CRS-9
27  Senate Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, The Post 9/11 Visa
Reforms.
28 Although consular decisions are not appealable or reviewable, some aliens are able to
bring additional information that may be used to overcome an initial refusal.
We are also piloting a one million dollar project to allow for seamless electronic
transmission of visa data among Foreign Service posts, the Department of State
and other Washington agencies.  The other agencies will no longer receive a
telegram but a reliable data transmission through an interoperable network that
begins with the Consular Consolidated Database.  Using the Consular
Consolidated Database as an electronic linchpin will improve data integrity,
accountability of responses in specific cases, and statistical reporting.27
Aliens Refused Visas.  As Table 1 presents, DOS refused a total of 273,017
applicants for immigrant visas in FY2000 and 194,55 in FY2002.  Those immigrant
petitioners refused on the basis of the grounds for exclusion totaled 67,269 in
FY2000 and 40,606 in FY2002.  In both years, most immigrant petitioners who were
rejected on INA exclusionary grounds were rejected because the DOS determined
that the aliens were inadmissible as likely public charges.  Other notable categories
were lack of proper labor certification, prior violations of immigration law, and
previous orders of removal from the United States.28
Table 1.  Immigrants Refused Visa by 
Grounds of Inadmissibility
Grounds for exclusion
Potential immigrants refused by State Department
FY2000 FY2002
Health 1,528 2.3% 1,176 2.9%
Criminal 736 1.1% 885 2.2%
Terrorism and security 32 0.1% 27 0.1%
Public charge 46,450 69.1% 17,848 44.0%
Labor certification 8,194 12.2% 10,046 27.7%
Immigration violations 3,414 5.1% 6,698 16.5%
Ineligible for citizenship 4  — 4  — 
Previously removed or illegal
presence 6,900 10.3% 3,909 9.6%
Miscellaneous 7  — 13  — 
Total inadmissible 67,269  — 40,606  — 
Ineligible for visa applied for
due to other reasons
205,742  — 194,255  — 
Source:  CRS analysis of DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs data.
CRS-10
While the grounds of inadmissibility are an important basis for denying foreign
nationals admission to the United States, it should be noted that more immigrant
petitions  who are rejected by DOS — 194,255 in FY2002 — were rejected because
their visa application did not comply with provisions in INA (technically referred to
as §221(g) noncompliance) — included in the last category listed in Table 1.
Refusals of nonimmigrant petitions presented in Table 2, have a somewhat
different pattern as previous immigration law violations has been the leading
category.  Violation of criminal law emerged as a more common ground for refusal
among nonimmigrant petitioners than it was for immigrant petitioners.  Prior orders
of removal from the United States was also among the leading grounds for refusals.
The overwhelming basis for denying nonimmigrant visas, however, was that the alien
was not qualified for the visa.
Table 2.  Nonimmigrants Refused Visa by 
Grounds of Inadmissibility
Grounds for exclusion
Potential nonimmigrant refused by State Department
FY2000 FY2002
Health 177 0.7% 390 1.2%
Criminal 4,370 18.2% 6,554 20.6%
Terrorism and security 224 1.0% 133 0.4%
Public charge 825 3.4% 2,069 6.5%
Immigration violations 14,263 60.% 17,070 53.7%
Documentation problems 1,143 4.8% 1,123 3.5%
Previously removed or illegal
presence
2,930 12.2% 4,428 13.9%
Miscellaneous 9  — 15 0.1%
Total inadmissible 23,953  — 31,793  — 
Ineligible for visa applied for
due to other reasons 2,428,248  — 2,560,526  — 
Source:  CRS analysis of DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs data.
  Comparable data from DHS on aliens deemed ineligible for immigrant status
or inadmissible as a nonimmigrant are not available.  As a result, the DOS data
presented above understate the number and distribution of aliens denied admission
to the United States.
CRS-11
29 U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security, Integrity and Security at the Border: The US VISIT
Program, hearing, Jan. 28, 2004.
30 §221(i) of INA; 8 U.S.C. §1201(i).
31 22 CFR §41.122 Notes N1.
Biometric Visas
Aliens who are successful in their request for a visa are then issued the actual
travel document.  By October 2004, all visas issued by the United States must use
biometric identifiers (e.g., finger scans) in addition to the photograph that has been
collected for some time.  At a recent congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs Maura Harty reported DOS’s progress in implementing
this requirement:
To comply with this requirement with respect to nonimmigrant visas, the State
Department began deployment of the Biometric Visa Program on September 22,
2003, at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium, and quickly followed suit at the
U.S. Consulate General in Frankfurt and Embassies in San Salvador and
Guatemala City.  I am pleased to report that the program is now operational at 55
visa-issuing posts and with our aggressive rollout schedule the program will be
in effect at all visa-issuing posts by October 26 of this year.  With regard to
immigrant visas, we will start issuing biometric visas in February and have this
program operational at all immigrant visa-issuing posts by October 26, 2004.29
As required by law, the biometric visa is an integral part of the entry-exit system
maintained by DHS’s immigration inspectors.  The biometric visas are then to be
matched against the fingerprint image scanned during the US-Visit system when the
alien arrives in the United States.
Revoking Visas
After a visa has been issued, the consular officer as well as the Secretary of State
has the discretionary authority to revoke a visa at any time.30  A consular officer must
revoke a visa if
! the alien is ineligible under INA §212(a) as described above to
receive such a visa, or was issued a visa and overstayed the time
limits of the visa;
! the alien is not entitled to the nonimmigrant visa classification under
INA §101(a)(15) definitions specified in such visa;
! the visa has been physically removed from the passport in which it
was issued; or
! the alien has been issued an immigrant visa.31
The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) instructs:  “in making any new
determination of ineligibility as a result of information which may come to light after
issuance of a visa, the consular officer must seek and obtain any required advisory
opinion.”  This applies, for example, to findings of ineligibility under
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“misrepresentation,” “terrorist activity” or “foreign policy.”  FAM further instructs:
“pending receipt of the Department’s advisory opinion, the consular officer must
enter the alien’s name in the CLASS under a quasi-refusal code, if warranted.”32
According to DOS officials, they sometimes prudentially revoke visas, i.e., they
revoke a visa as a safety precaution.  A “prudential revocation” is undertaken with
a relatively low threshold of national security information to ensure that all relevant
or potentially relevant facts about an alien are thoroughly explored before admitting
that alien to the United States.33
Legislation in 107th Congress
Congress’s plenary authority over immigration policy derives from Article 1, §8
of the U.S. Constitution, and the legislative branch has long taken the lead in
immigration policy.  The 107th Congress enacted several major laws that included
significant revisions to visa policy administration and issuances.  The key visa
provisions in these major laws are summarized below.34
USA PATRIOT Act
The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) was a broad anti-terrorism measure that
included several important changes to immigration law, including specific visa policy
matters.  Foremost, it expanded the definition of terrorism and the designation of
terrorist organizations used to determine the inadmissibility and removal of aliens.
The act further sought to improve the visa issuance process by mandating data
sharing so that consular officers have access to relevant electronic information.
These provisions authorized the Attorney General to share data from domestic
criminal record databases with the Secretary of State for the purpose of adjudicating
visa applications.35
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The USA PATRIOT Act additionally mandated that by October 1, 2003, all
aliens applying for admission under the VWP must have machine-readable passports.
However, the act allows the Secretary of State to waive the requirement until
September 30, 2007 if he finds that the country is making progress towards
instituting machine-readable passports and preventing passport fraud.36  Amendments
to these provisions and progress in implementation are discussed elsewhere.37
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
173, hereafter referred to as the Border Security and Visa Reform Act) expressly
targeted the improvement of visa issuance procedures.  Among its provisions, it
required the development of an interoperable electronic data system to be used to
share information relevant to alien admissibility and removability and the
implementation of an integrated entry-exit data system.  It also requires that all visas
issued by October 2004 have biometric identifiers. In addition to increasing consular
officers’ access to electronic information needed for visa issuances, it expanded the
training requirements for consular officers who issue visas.38
The Border Security and Visa Reform Act placed new requirements on the
VWP, specifically mandating that the government of each VWP country certify by
October 26, 2004 that it has established a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-
readable passports with a biometric identifier.  The act also requires all VWP
countries to certify that they report in a timely manner the theft of blank passports,
allowing the Secretary of DHS to remove a country from the program if it is
determined that the country is not reporting thefts of blank passports.
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Homeland Security Act
Prior to establishment of the DHS, two departments — the DOS through
Consular Affairs and the DOJ through INS — each played key roles in administering
the law and policies on the admission of aliens.  At that time, the INA gave DOS
responsibility for issuing visas abroad, and specifically assigned such decisions to
consular officers.39  The Homeland Security Act of 2002  (P.L. 107-296) states that
DHS through the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security issues
regulations regarding visa issuances and assigns staff to consular posts abroad to
advise, review, and conduct investigations, and that DOS’s Consular Affairs will
continue to issue visas.40  The memorandum of understanding that implements the
working relationship between DOS and DHS’s three immigration-related bureaus
was signed September 29, 2003.
Current Issues in the 108th Congress
9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations
The recently issued report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) offered its assessment
of how visa and immigration inspection failures contributed to the terrorist attacks.
The 9/11 Commission contended that “(t)here were opportunities for intelligence and
law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda’s travel vulnerabilities.”  The report went on to
state:  “Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers
! included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been
watchlisted;
! presented fraudulent passports;
! presented passports with suspicious indicators of extremism;
! made detectable false statements on visa applications;
! made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the
United States; and
! violated immigration laws while in the United States.”41
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The report maintained that border security was not considered to be a national
security matter prior to 9/11, and as a result neither the State Department’s consular
officers nor the former INS’s inspectors and officers were considered full partners in
national counterterrorism efforts.42
The 9/11 Commission has made several recommendations that underscore the
urgency of implementing legislative provisions on visa policy and immigration
control that Congress enacted several years ago.  They also suggest areas in which
Congress may wish to take further action.  The specific recommendations are:
! Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as
targeting their money.  The United States should combine terrorist
travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to
intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain
terrorist mobility.
! The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger
network of screening points that includes our transportation system
and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors.
! The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the
Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-
exit screening system, including a single system for speeding
qualified travelers.
! The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the
American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major
effort to collaborate with other governments.43
Other 9/11 Commission recommendations, notably those related to intelligence
policy and structures, have been the focus thus far of congressional consideration and
media attention.  The 9/11 Commission is reportedly preparing a subsequent report
that deals expressly with immigration issues.
Visa Revocation and Removal
Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office reviewed
240 cases of visa revocations and identified several problems.  It found that the
appropriate units within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the former INS
were not always notified, that “lookouts” were not consistently posted on the watch
lists of suspected terrorists; that 30 foreign nationals whose visas had been revoked
entered the United States and may still remain; and that the FBI and the former INS
were not routinely taking action to investigate, locate the individuals, or resolve the
cases.44
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DOS responded to the GAO study by arguing that it was not fair or accurate to
suggest that all persons whose visas were revoked were terrorists or suspected
terrorists.  In many such instances, DOS reports that it  finds that the national security
information does not pertain to the alien whose visa was revoked (a mistaken identity
due to incomplete identifying data), or that the information can be explained in a way
that clarifies the question at hand and eliminates the potential threat.  In these cases,
the consular officers re-issue the visa and purge the alien’s name from the lookout
system.  DOS maintains that the problem has been fixed in the creation last year of
a revocation code that is shared with the relevant agencies via IBIS when a visa is
prudentially revoked.  It reportedly was put into place in December 2002, and DOS
asserts that it has verified that each and every revocation for calendar year 2003 was
properly coded and entered into CLASS and IBIS, and was available almost
simultaneously to law enforcement and border inspection colleagues.45
A spokesperson for DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau
(ICE) recently disputed GAO’s findings.  He stated that its records indicate that the
National Security Unit (NSU) in ICE received information on 10 leads involving visa
revocations and that the NSU conducted follow-up investigations in all 10 cases.  He
reported that NSU concluded that there was insufficient evidence under current civil
and criminal immigration law to allow ICE to take action against the visa holders.46
A subsequent GAO report, issued in July 2004, concluded that additional
actions were needed to address weakness in the visa revocation process.  In this
report, GAO stated:  “our analysis of visas revoked based on terrorism concerns from
October through December 2003 revealed that weaknesses remained in the
implementation of the visa revocation process, especially relating to the timely
transmission of information among federal agencies.”  GAO also pointed out that
“(w)ith respect to an alien already present in the United States, the Department of
State’s current visa revocation certificate makes the revocation effective only upon
the alien’s departure.”  DHS officials maintain that they would be unable to place the
alien in removal proceedings based solely on a visa revocation that had not yet taken
place.47
An emerging issue is the legal process for removing aliens whose visas have
been revoked.  Under current law the grounds for removal are similar — but not
identical — to the grounds for  inadmissibly discussed above, and include national
security and related grounds as well as document fraud.  Some maintain that a foreign
national should be immediately removed if the visa that enabled his or her entry has
been revoked.  They recommend that grounds for removal in the INA §212(a) should
be amended to expressly state visa revocation as a basis for deportation. Some further
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argue that aliens whose visas are revoked should not be entitled to a hearing before
an immigration judge to determine if the alien should be deported.  Others assert that
current law balances the broader discretion given to the consular officers abroad with
the explicit standards of the grounds for inadmissibility and the legal process for
removing aliens from the United States.  They further maintain that consular officers
often make “prudential revocations” of visas that they subsequently re-issue and that
anecdotal cases of mistaken identities suggest that the alien screening databases are
not sufficiently precise to be the basis for removal without a hearing.
On July 15, 2004, legislation (S. 2661) was introduced that would amend the
INA to make the revocation of visas and of other documentation authorizing
admission administratively and judicially unreviewable.  It also would add revocation
of visas to those grounds of inadmissibility supporting deportation (thus making
aliens subject to such revocation immediately removable).
Implementing New Technologies  
Citing problems implementing the technology, the Bush Administration sought
extensions in installing the biometric readers/scanners required by the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002.48  The 108th Congress has
passed H.R. 4417, which amends the law to extend by one year (to October 26, 2005)
the deadline for installing at all U.S. ports of entry equipment and software capable
of processing machine-readable, tamper-resistant entry and exit documents and
passports that contain biometric identifiers.  It also extends by one year the deadline
for VWP countries to certify that they are issuing machine-readable, tamper-resistant
passports that contain biometric and document authentication identifiers comporting
with specified standards, and VWP participants who are issued passports on or after
the new deadline to present passports that comply with such requirements.  H.R.
4417 passed the House on June 16, 2004, and passed the Senate without amendment
on July 22, 2004. It was sent to the President on July 28, 2004.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been
raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States
legally on temporary visas.  Although the INA bars terrorists, consular officers
issuing the visas and immigration inspectors working at the borders did not have
access to all the law enforcement and intelligence databases that might identify
potential terrorists.  As discussed above, Congress has enacted several major laws
requiring information sharing and interoperable databases.  Whether these provisions
are being successfully implemented remains an important policy question.49
CRS-18
49 (...continued)
GAO-03-322, Apr. 15, 2003; and U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security:
Challenges in Implementing Border Technology, GAO-03-546T, Mar. 12, 2003.
50 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information, Border Technology: Keeping Terrorists Out of the
United States — 2003, hearing, Mar. 12, 2003.
Many assert that the need for all agencies involved in admitting aliens to share
intelligence and coordinate activities is essential for U.S. immigration policy to be
effective in guarding homeland security.  Some maintain that the reforms Congress
made in the mid-1990s requiring all visa applicants to be checked in the “look out”
databases were inadequate because the databases across the relevant agencies were
not interoperable and the various agencies were territorial with their data.  They
maintain that, in the long run, the most efficient and effective guard against the entry
of aliens who would do us harm is an interagency and inter-departmental database
that is accessible in “real time” to consular officers, immigration inspectors, and key
law enforcement and intelligence officials.
Others point to the cost, time, and complexity of developing interoperable
databases.  They cite the difficulty thus far in determining what biometric identifiers
are most appropriate for screening aliens.50  They point out competing technologies
of the existing databases in which various key agencies have already heavily
invested.  Some maintain that success of the interoperable database technology
depends on 100% inclusion of aliens applying for visas and seeking admission, but
that the sheer scope of such a system poses “real time” implementation issues.  They
also warn that if intelligence data become too accessible across agencies, national
security may actually be breached because sensitive information may be more likely
to fall into the wrong hands.
On a related matter, concerns have been raised that consular officers did not
personally interview many aliens to whom they issue nonimmigrant visas.  By-
passing the personal interview, especially for visitors coming for purportedly short
periods of time, was advocated by some as an efficiency of staffing and resources.
Critics assert that this cost savings comes at too high a price in terms of national
security.  While some argue that checking an alien’s name in a database is no
substitute for a face-to-face interview, others assert that the value of a brief personal
interview is overrated as a security precaution and that time is better spent doing
more thorough background checks.  DOS’s interim final regulations that increase the
type and number of aliens required to have a personal interview have sparked
concern that the waiting times to obtain a visa will increase dramatically.  H.R. 3452
and H.R. 3522 would, among other provisions, require all visa applicants to be
interviewed.
Potential Impact on Business
A perceived slowdown in visa issuances has sparked concern among the
business community.  A recent study conducted for a group of international trade
associations estimated that problems with visas have cost U.S. exporters $30.7 billion
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in revenue and indirect costs since July 2002.51  Some members of the business
community have expressed concern about the dependence of their operational success
on “the timeliness, predictability and efficiency of our visa and immigration
system.”52  These business representatives have claimed that security checks such as
the Visa Mantis and Visa Condor programs have caused delays in the issuance of
visas that could strain international business relationships.  The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce acknowledges that its assertions about the negative impact tightened visa
requirements are having on U.S. business are based on anecdotes rather than on
statistics, but contends that these accounts involve “key personnel, often essential for
the operation of a company that experience[s] delays.”53 The critics maintain that the
scope of the alleged problem is multifaceted and not limited to initially bringing
people from abroad to work in the United States.  Companies that employ
nonimmigrants who must renew their visas are affected as well.  In addition, foreign
customers of U.S. firms typically travel here for plant visits and design meetings, to
inspect products prior to their shipment abroad, and for training on the equipment
being produced by the U.S. company.  Similarly, some U.S. companies hold
conferences annually for foreign distributors of their products, and there have been
accounts of visitors from abroad being unable to secure visas in time to attend the
events.54  For the same reason, conference and trade show planners reportedly are
reconsidering whether to hold meetings in the United States.55
Others argue that the impact of the more stringent visa policies on business has
been exaggerated, sparked by problems because the new screening procedures and
databases were not fully operational.  These observers maintain that the visa reforms
are essential for national security and that business-related travel will normalize once
everyone is familiar with the new procedures.  Some speculate that generalized travel
concerns after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the slow down in the U.S.
economy were key factors in the reduction in nonimmigrant visas issued in FY2002
and FY2003.
Other Security Concerns
The Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act of 2003 (H.R. 1440/S. 710) would,
among other things, further broaden the security and terrorism grounds of
inadmissibility to exclude aliens who have participated in the commission of acts of
torture or extrajudicial killings abroad.  In addition to denying visas to such aliens,
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these bills also would make aliens already in the United States removable on the
same grounds. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 710, filing a written
report on November 24, 2003 (S.Rept. 108-209).
New Ground of Inadmissibility
On May 13, 2004, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1609, which
would, among other things, amend the INA to make an alien excludable from United
States for nonpayment of child support.  It would permit admission upon satisfaction
of payments or in compliance with a payment schedule.  It has been placed on the
Senate calendar.
